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We can therefore conclude that the choice of incentive payments is compatible with the constraints 
if: 
Cbp ≤ Cp + Cb           i.e. if there are economies of scope; 
Cb ≤ Cp                   if the task of the central bank is more demanding (this is clear if one thinks of  
                                the fact that the central bank is also responsible for banking stability as lender  
                                of last resort);  
P3b < P1b                  it is natural to expect this given the definition of these probabilities (in other   
                                 words it is normal to expect that it is easier to achieve banking stability if the  
                                 authority responsible makes an effort in this direction). 
In these cases, in the election period it is to the politician’s advantage to appoint a single agent for 
the two roles. 
 
7. Contract with a single agent in the non-electoral period. 
 In the post-electoral period, government authorities will want to contain the negative effects, in 
terms of inflation, deriving from the non-socially beneficial decisions  taken, during the election 
period, to maximize the probability of re-election. 
For this reason in the non-electoral period the politician will prefer price stability and stability in the 
banking system. He will therefore offer the CB the following payments 
T11          if                E1 =  Bs∩Ps 
T10           “                E2 =  Bs∩-Ps 
T01           “                E3 = -Bs∩Ps 
T00           “                E4 = -Bs∩-Ps 
with (presumably)   
(33) T11 ≥ T10 ,  T01 ≥ T00 . 
The politician’s expected net utility in the non-electoral period will be: 
                E(U-u | e11) =  H’ – K’ 
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where   
            H’ = G P2b (1 + P1p R) + g (1 - P2b) (1 + r P2p)    
and   
            K’ = P2b [u(T11) P1p  + u(T10) (1 – P1p)]  + (1 – P2b) [u(T01) P2p + u(T00) (1 – P2p)] 
The first one (H’) is the benefit expected by the politician, while (K’) is the cost for the politician. 
The incentive expected by CB will be: 
E(Ip | ebp) = T11 Pr(E1 | ebp) + T10 Pr(E2 | ebp) + T01 Pr(E3 | ebp) + T00 Pr(E4 | ebp) – Cbp(ebp). 
The incentive and participation constraints become : 
(34)  
g1 = E(Ip | e11) - E(Ip | e10) ≥ 0 
g2 = E(Ip | e11) - E(Ip | e01) ≥ 0 
g3 = E(Ip | e11) - E(Ip | e00) ≥ 0 
g4 = E(Ip | e11) ≥ 0 
or 
(35)  
g1 = g4 - E(Ip | e10) ≥ 0 
g2 = g4 - E(Ip | e01) ≥ 0 
g3 = g4 - E(Ip | e00) ≥ 0 
g4 = E(Ip | e11) ≥ 0 
The costs of effort will assume the same values already seen in (32), that is25: 
(32) Cbp(ebp) = 
0                  if    e00
Cbp               if     e11
Cbp – Cp        if     e10  
Cbp – Cb        if     e01. 
          
     
                                                 
25 For the problem of constrained optimization, see appendix D. We will not examine any particular case, but we will 
go straight on to compare the two contracts: the two-agent and the single-agent contract. 
  
 
 19
